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REGULATION S-K ITEM 402(S):
REGULATING COMPENSATION
INCENTIVE-BASED RISK THROUGH
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman.” 1
It is axiomatic that transparency underlies the United States capital
markets and the entire public company mandatory disclosure
scheme.2 Periodic reports and public offering registration documents
are intended to provide potential investors and current shareholders
with the information necessary to make informed decisions whether
to buy, sell, or hold securities.3 Disclosure of such extensive
information comes at a price—periodic disclosure documents can
reach several hundred pages, costing companies and their
management and directors, significant expense and time.4 The federal
securities laws’ focus on disclosure, transparency, and informed
investor choice are not only important tools against investment fraud
but are also thought to be important deterrents to other undesirable
corporate conduct and decision making.5 Yet, it seems that no matter
1

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92

(1914).
2 See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1341 (1996) (discussing how market
transparency and disclosure requirements are unique and essential to the American markets).
3 See Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law
After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L. Q. 449, 450 (2002) (“At its core, the primary policy of the federal
securities laws involves the remediation of information asymmetries, that is, equalization of the
information available to outside investors and insiders.”).
4 See James Pethokoukis, Annual Report, R.I.P., THE AMERICAN: THE JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, (Jan./Feb. 2008), http://www.american.com/archive/2008/
january-february-magazine-contents/annual-report-r-i-p (describing post-Sarbanes-Oxley annual
reports as huge, undecipherable “data dumps”); Arthur J. Radin, Have We Created Financial
Statement Disclosure Overload?, THE CPA JOURNAL ONLINE, (Nov. 2007), http://www.
nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2007/1107/perspectives/p6.htm (noting that a sampling of 10-K annual
disclosure reports average 150 pages).
5 See Seligman, supra note 3, at 449–50 (discussing the harm done to investors when
corporations act without making proper disclosures to shareholders, which was the
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how much information is currently disclosed, with each new financial
or corporate scandal, even more disclosure is compelled in response.6
It is no surprise, then, that disclosure requirements have grown as a
result of the 2008 collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
The unprecedented collapse of two of Wall Street’s most
longstanding and prominent investment banks sparked the worst
phase of the most recent “scandal,” or more aptly, “Financial Crisis.”7
The sophisticated and risky financial products that generated billions
of dollars in profit for the financial services industry during the
preceding years, culminated with dramatic and devastating effects.8
To prevent a global economic collapse, the federal government
injected nearly $250 billion into the financial sector by purchasing
assets and equity from troubled financial institutions via the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).9 From its inception, TARP
government’s impetus for creating the Securities and Exchange Commission and passing the
Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934).
6 The foundational securities laws, under which corporate disclosure originated, were
enacted under the New Deal Congress in response to widespread securities fraud. See Securities
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 48 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77g,
77h(b), 77j (2006)) (defining disclosure responsibilities attendant to company’s sale of
securities); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (2006)) (prescribing mandatory periodic reporting, proxy
related, and tender-offer related reporting for entities with publicly traded securities and certain
others), amended by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1797 (2010). Recently, the sweeping reform of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 mandated further disclosure in response to the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 7201-66 (2006)).
7 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF HUBRIS AND WRETCHED
EXCESS ON WALL STREET (2009) (chronicling the fall of Bear Stearns); LARRY ELLIOTT & DAN
ATKINSON, THE GODS THAT FAILED: HOW BLIND FAITH IN MARKETS HAS COST US OUR
FUTURE (2009) (discussing the failure of Bear Stearns and Northern Rocky); GEORGE SOROS,
THE CRASH OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS (2d
ed. 2009) (analyzing the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the origins of the 2008 financial
crisis).
8 The casualties included two of Wall Street’s oldest and most preeminent investment
banks—Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers—while many other financial firms hung on by a
thread. See Robin Sidel et al., The Week That Shook Wall Street: Inside the Demise of Bear
Stearns, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2008, at A1 (detailing the fall of Bear Stearns).
9 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, § 2(1), 122 Stat.
3765, 3766 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201)); see also OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR
GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (July
21, 2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/July2009_Quarterly_
Report_to_Congress.pdf (summarizing the execution and effect of the Troubled Asset Relief
Program). For a more exacting analysis of TARP and its implications see J.W. Verret, Treasury
Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 283
(2010) (analyzing TARP under several prominent theories of corporate law and predicting how
the Treasury Department’s stock ownership will reshape corporate law) and Barbara Black, The
U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business and the Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUS. L.J. 561 (2010) (examining the government’s actions as a shareholder in five major U.S.
companies).
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generated significant controversy and numerous critics.10 However,
when insurance behemoth American International Group (AIG)
released compensation data for its failed derivatives trading group—
including substantial bonuses funded by federal TARP assistance—
public outrage over executive compensation practices came to a
derisive head.11
Policymakers, commentators, and business executives have all
offered various, and in many cases, competing theories outlining the
“causes” of the Financial Crisis.12 Conventional wisdom claims that
“perverse” compensation bonus incentives paid to individual bankers
are to blame in large part.13 Others believe the banks themselves
disregarded risk because they were engaged in a figurative “arms
race” amongst each other, competing to amass the largest profits for
their respective organizations and, consequently, paying their
employees the largest bonuses.14 But others contend that the empirical
evidence linking incentive-based compensation and excessive risk
taking is lacking, and maintain that the bankers simply lacked
foresight and were ignorant of the substantial risks inherent in the
various transactions in which they were engaged.15
10 See Michael R. Crittenden, Panel Steps Up Criticism of Treasury Over TARP, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009, at A3 (discussing “scathing criticism” of TARP by five-member
congressional oversight panel).
11 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, At A.I.G., Huge Bonuses After $170
Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1 (“Word of the bonuses . . . stirred such deep
consternation inside the Obama administration that Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner told
the firm they were unacceptable and demanded they be renegotiated . . . .”); Edmund L.
Andrews & Peter Baker, Bonus Money at Troubled A.I.G. Draws Heavy Criticism, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/16aig.html (noting that both the
Obama administration and Republicans universally condemned the A.I.G. bonuses).
12 For a detailed analysis of the financial crisis, its causes, and the subsequent bailouts, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage
Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376 (2008) (“[M]ost of the causes . . . can be attributed to
conflicts of interest, investor complacency, and overall complexity, all exacerbated by
cupidity.”).
13 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 247 (2010) (arguing that bank executive compensation packages insulate their recipients
from company losses and lead executives to insufficiently weigh investment risks); Claire Hill
& Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers
Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1173 (2010) (arguing that
stock based executive compensation caused managers to take excessive risks that inflicted
damage on creditors and society); Fredrick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring
Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation (Emory Public Law, Research Paper 10-93, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546229 (“[E]quity compensation tends to induce greater
risk taking by aligning managers’ risk preferences with those of equity holders.”).
14 See Ing-Haw Cheng et al., Yesterday’s Heroes: Compensation and Creative RiskTaking (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16176, 2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16176.pdf (analyzing the correlation between residual bonuses
and executive risk taking).
15 Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 18
(Charles A. Dice Ctr. For Research in Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-13, 2010), available
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Nevertheless, the notion of “excessive” or “imprudent” risk taking
emerges as a common thread in the various articulations.16
Interestingly, and perhaps intuitively, most commentators and
legislators have almost myopically associated excessive or imprudent
risk taking with “excessive” or “perverse” executive compensation
arrangements.17 Indeed the public is led to believe that short-term
incentive-based bonus compensation constitutes a significant, and
arguably obscene, portion of the total compensation awarded to many
business executives and employees because huge bonus payouts make
the news.18
Indeed, Congress viewed risk management and mitigation as focal
points in the recent Dodd-Frank legislation.19 Further, the Securities
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) recently released new Regulation SK disclosure enhancements aimed at increasing internal riskmanagement, and requiring disclosure where incentive-based
compensation is likely to result in imprudent risk taking that is
damaging to the corporation.20 The new requirements largely focus on

at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1439859 (“[O]ur results cannot be explained by the large share
ownership of some CEOs of investment banks that performed poorly.”); Floyd Norris, It May be
Outrageous, but Wall Street Pay Didn’t Cause This Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at B1
(“[T]here is little evidence that big pay – or the incentives connected to it – caused the financial
train wreck that sent the world into recession . . . . To the contrary, there is plenty of evidence
that no one who counted – traders, chief executives or regulators – understood the risks that
were being taken.”).
16 See generally Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 13 (arguing that executive
compensation packages lead executives to insufficiently weigh investment risks); Tung, supra
note 13 (arguing that stock based executive compensation plans may have caused executives to
engage in excessive risk taking).
17 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
18 See Aaron Lucchetti, Wall Street Expects 5% Bonus Rise, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2010 at
C2 (noting that although hedge fund and private equity bonus compensation is set to rise, stock
and bond traders should expect a 20–30% decline in bonus for 2010 based on poor earnings).
19 See, e.g., Executive Compensation Oversight After the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th
Cong. 6–8 (2010) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System) (describing the guidance adopted by the Federal Reserve); see also id.
60–69 (statement of Meredith Cross, Director, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and
Exchange Commission ) (describing new SEC rules addressing executive compensation).
20 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68334 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274). Recent financial and corporate reforms focus on
providing shareholders with greater disclosure of how banks and other publically traded
corporations compensate executives, manage and mitigate imprudent risk taking, while
concurrently giving shareholders a “say” on these issues. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899-900 (2010)
(requiring public companies to include a non-binding resolution subject to shareholder vote in
their proxy materials approving executive compensation); id. §§ 953, 955, 124 Stat. at 1903-05
(requiring further disclosure of executive compensation arrangements in proxy statements); id. §
954, 124 Stat. at 1904 (expanding the scope of “clawback” of certain executive payments that
were based on improper financial statements); id. § 956, 124 Stat. at 1905-06 (requiring federal
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disclosure, but fail to provide meaningful guidance on how reporting
companies are to gauge risk or can delineate productive prudent risk
taking from excessive risk taking.21 Nevertheless, companies are
required to evaluate and disclose how their compensation schemes
may encourage imprudent risk-taking behavior. In light of these
considerations, this Comment first attempts to succinctly explore the
SEC’s intent in implementing the disclosure enhancements and
delineate the likely intended scope of disclosure. Second, this
Comment suggests that firms consider adopting various mitigation
and deferment mechanisms to limit their exposure to potential
liability stemming from disclosure requirements, and to encourage
prudent risk taking in compliance with internal risk-management
policies. These recommendations will be analyzed in light of
traditional theories of executive-compensation and corporate-reform
requirements.
This Comment proceeds in two Parts. The first Part describes how
compensation practices may theoretically incentivize employees to
take imprudent risks or create adverse risk in general, focusing on
potential agency issues inherent in the shareholder-manager
relationship. The second Part explores the scope of Regulation S-K
Item 402(s), which requires public companies to disclose
compensation risk that is reasonably likely to have a materially
adverse effect, from the perspectives of both the SEC and subject
companies.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
Executive compensation in the United States has long been
considered a problematic corporate governance issue.22 It has
generated even further attention and condemnation over the past few
decades given the seemingly exponential growth of executive

regulators to issue guidelines mandating the disclosure of incentive-based compensation that
encourages inappropriate risks at banking holding companies, registered broker-deals, and other
investment firms); id. § 952, 124 Stat. at 1900 (requiring compensation committee
independence).
21 See Karl S. Okamoto & Douglas O. Edwards, Risk Taking, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 159,
159–60 (2010) (arguing that current regulatory attempts to curb excessive risk taking fail to
provide an account of “optimal risk taking”).
22 See George T. Washington, The Corporation Executive’s Living Wage, 54 HARV. L.
REV. 733, 733 (1941) (discussing excessive executive compensation as a source of employee
and shareholder dissatisfaction); see also JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN
CORPORATE FINANCE 25–26 (3d ed. 2003) (noting that excessive compensation was a crucial
justification for federal securities regulation in the 1930s).
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compensation packages in relation to the “average” employee wage.23
Whether the dollar figure awarded to executives is patently
reasonable or excessive is beyond the scope of this Comment. Rather,
this Comment is concerned with the extent to which compensation
practices may be tied to imprudent risk taking, and how companies
should handle this situation in light of Item 402(s) disclosure
requirements.24
A for-profit corporation’s primary objective is to “conduct . . .
business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain.”25 Specifically, maximization of long-term, as
opposed to short-term, shareholder gain is fundamental.26 In all
business dealings, however, elements of uncertainty and risk exist as
potential impediments to the realization of profit.27 Prudent
corporations must therefore evaluate the risk/reward attributes of
corporate actions to determine those most likely to achieve optimal
results. The question then becomes: who makes this assessment?
A corporation’s stakeholders typically exercise very little direct
control over the direction and management of the corporation,
particularly in the case of large, publicly traded corporations.28 That
task is left to corporate boards of directors, who in turn delegate
23 See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 847 (2002) (noting that among
CEO compensation in S&P 500 companies from 1992 through 200, “median total compensation
nearly tripled from $2.3 million in 1992 to over $6.5 million in 2000”); Jeffery Moriarty, How
Much Compensation Can CEOs Permissibly Accept?, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235, 235 (2009)
(noting that CEO compensation is 314 times the $32,142 earned by the median full-time private
industry worker in the U.S. in 2006).
24 Although specific dollar figures are not the focus of this paper, it should be noted that
incentive-based compensation typically constitutes a substantial portion of executive
compensation packages, particularly within the financial services industry where these particular
issues are most likely to arise. See e.g., Louise Story, Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2010, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/executive_pay/
index.html?scp=1&sq=executive%20compensation%20and%20risk%20&st=cse (noting that
executive compensation funds began to soar in the 1980s and 1990s).
25 1 THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(a) (1992). But see David P. Porter, Institutional
Investors and Their Role in Corporate Governance: Reflections by a “Recovering” Corporate
Governance Lawyer, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627, 639–40 (2009) (discussing alternative
theories of corporations such as social responsibility).
26 See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 25, at cmt. f (“[T]hat the objective of
the corporation is to conduct business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and
shareholder gain [] does not mean that the objective of the corporation must be to realize
corporate profit and shareholder gain in the short run. Indeed, the contrary is true: long-run
profitability and shareholder gain are at the core of the economic objective.”).
27 FRANK H. KNIGHT, R ISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (8th ed. 1957) (explaining why
risk and uncertainty does not give rise to profits).
28 See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J.L. & ECON. 301, 313 (1983) (discussing the delegation of internal control of a public
corporation to a board of directors).
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responsibility to executive officers, who run the day-to-day operations
of the corporation.29 But achievement of the long-term profit
objective may be compromised where corporate executives and their
employees make business decisions while receiving a fixed salary and
bearing little “risk.” In the meantime, “those who take the risk and
receive profits—the stockholders—make no decisions, exercise no
control.”30 In response to this conundrum, boards often structure
compensation packages to award executives with incentive-based
bonuses or equity awards, based on the achievement of a particular
target or benchmark.31
Scholars are sharply divided on the question of whether incentivebased compensation provides executives with perverse incentives to
take imprudent risks at their company’s expense. Professors Lucian
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have extensively studied the various forms
of CEO compensation and ultimately conclude that the so-called
“pay-for-performance” incentive-based payments have failed to
deliver on their promise.32 They articulate two primary criticisms of
traditional corporate governance of executive compensation
arrangements. First, in the executive compensation context, an
inherent conflict of interest in the agency relationship exists, at least
in theory, between shareholders and management.33 Second, the
Id.
KNIGHT, supra note 27, at 203 (“There is an apparent separation of the functions of
making decisions and taking the ‘risk’ of error in decisions.”).
31 LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 15 (2004) (describing the design of executive
compensation as protecting shareholder interests).
32 See, e.g., id. (describing significant flaws in corporate governance and executive
compensation packages and suggesting that they must fundamentally change if companies are to
be managed in a manner that promotes shareholders’ interests); Lucian Arye Bebcuck & Jesse
M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72 (2003)
(explaining that substantial costs are imposed on shareholders when managers have influence
over their own pay); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002) (describing executive
compensation as rent extraction, which produce “suboptimal incentives” and ultimately hurts
shareholder value in a company); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without
Performance: Overview of the Issues, 17 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8 (2005) (discussing how
executive compensation in the United States has strayed from the model upon which it was
built, arm’s-length negotiation). But see Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation and
Short-Termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 577, 577 (2006)
(arguing that, in a speculative market where stock prices may deviate from fundamentals, an
emphasis on short-term stock performance may be the outcome of an optimal contracting
problem rather than rent extraction by managers).
33 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 31, at 15–16. To mitigate the inherent tension
between agents and principals, corporate law requires firms to elect boards of directors, who in
turn, are required to act in the best interest of the shareholders. State law governs the
relationship between directors and shareholders by imposing a fiduciary duty of good faith and
loyalty on directors to act in the best interest of the corporation’s shareholders. See, e.g., Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) (holding that the board of directors of Trans
29
30
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notion that boards represent shareholders’ interests by negotiating
compensation arrangements at arm’s length with management may be
flawed if boards are not truly independent.34
Bebchuk and Fried argue that current compensation packages are
often overly favorable to management because directors are reluctant
to seriously negotiate and hold executives accountable for their
performance.35 Additionally, they suggest that incentive-based
schemes may provide perverse incentives for executives to maximize
current compensation by taking short-term hyper-risks while ignoring
serious long-term systemic risks.36 This argument is easy to
understand when compensation packages are overly weighted toward
short-term, rather than long-term, payouts, especially in industries
where frequent lateral employment moves are common. It seems
obvious that an employee who does not plan to stay at the current
Union Corp. breached their fiduciary duty to Trans Union shareholders and were grossly
negligent by failing to make an informed business decision regarding a cash-out merger and
failing to disclose material facts regarding the merger to shareholders), superseded by statute,
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102 (2001), as recognized in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85,
90 (Del. 2001); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del.
1986) (stating that duty of directors when company is being sold is to maximize company’s
value for shareholders). Notably, the business judgment rule limits the extent of directors’
fiduciary duty to shareholders in disinterested transactions. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (holding that board will enjoy protection of
business judgment rule, in suits challenging propriety of its takeover defenses, where directors
demonstrate their good faith, reasonable investigation and proportionality of defenses against
perceived harm to corporation).
34 BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 31, at 23–44 (describing the design of executive
compensation structures). Generally, the director-primacy model underlies traditional corporate
law’s approach to executive compensation. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The
Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (exploring the
benefits and implications of the director-primacy model across the spectrum of corporate law).
At its core, the director-primacy model assumes that boards, bargaining at arm’s length with
corporate executives, negotiate pay arrangements designed to serve shareholders’ interest. See
id. at 562 (noting the recent trend of paying directors in stock, which serves to align director and
shareholder interests). Additionally, national stock exchange listing requirements mandate that
“independent” directors must constitute a majority on the boards of listed companies.
NASDAQ, LISTING STANDARDS & FEES 22 (2010), available at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/
nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf. Accordingly, it can be assumed that when Bebchuk discusses a
lack of director independence, he does so figuratively (i.e. social relationships between
independent directors and management as influencing director objectivity) rather than literally
(i.e. directors are all insiders or affiliates).
35 Theoretically, the widely accepted director-primacy model serves to mitigate the
agency problem because independent directors constitute a majority of boards, and it is assumed
that independent directors negotiate executive compensation at arm’s length with management.
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 31, at 17 (describing the corporate theory of arm’s-length
negotiating between directors and executives for executive compensation). Bebchuk and Fried’s
“managerial power” critique contends that a structural bias among those who comprise boards
of directors and managements of corporations prohibits arm’s length bargaining. Id. at 61–79.
36 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, How to Fix Bankers’ Pay, 139 DAEDALUS 52, 53 (2010)
(suggesting that executives’ ability to garner large amounts of compensation based on shortterm results induces them to take excessive risk).
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employer for the long term will be motivated to maximize her shortterm reward, without regard for the long-term consequences. By the
time the unfortunate results occur, the employee will have cashed out
and moved on, often to an even more lucrative position.
The critical debate over whether short-term compensation bonus
incentives actually incentivized banking executives to engage in
hyper-risky transactions, or whether ignorance or underestimation of
the risk alone is to blame, however, is more contentious than Bebchuk
and Fried’s general conclusions.37 Proponents of the latter theory
suggest that compensation incentives were irrelevant to the
discussion, as executives at Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns
maintained outstanding stock and options that were not cashed in
before the Financial Crisis.38 Even assuming that executives did not
knowingly engage in short-term risk-taking compensation
arrangements that award executives handsomely for short-term profit,
their compensation arrangements may nonetheless have discouraged
them from appropriately gauging long-term risk.39 At the systemic
level, however, it is arguably less likely that compensation bonus

37 Compare William D. Cohan, Make Wall Street Risk It All, N.Y. TIMES ONLINE (Oct. 7,
2010, 8:40 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/make-wall-street-risk-itall/?scp=4&sq=excessive%20risk-taking%20financial%20crisis&st=cse (“We already have
definitive proof that Wall Street’s compensation practices lead to excessive risk-taking: witness
the way Wall Street’s armies kept selling mortgage-based securities filled with defaulting home
mortgages long after the securities made any sense as an investment. Wall Street did the same
thing in the 1980s with junk bonds, the same thing in the 1990s with Internet initial public
offerings, and the same thing in the in the early 2000s with the debt of emerging
telecommunications companies.”), with Ira T. Kay, CEO Pay for Performance: The Solution to
“Managerial Power,” 30 J. CORP. L. 785 (2005) (arguing that the current pay model is not
broken, but agrees that more long-term vesting equity awards are preferable).
38 See Floyd Norris, It May Be Outrageous, But Wall Street Pay Didn’t Cause this Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at B1 (noting that most bank CEOs lost millions of dollars in share
value in the 2008 financial crisis and did not sell their shares to avoid losses); Jeffrey Friedman,
Op-Ed., Bank Pay and the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (September 28, 2009, 10:27
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204488304574429293838639418.html
?KEYWORDS=%22jeffrey+friedman%22 (relying on the Lehman CEOs’ large paper losses as
a basis for his view that financial firm compensation structure was not at fault for bank’s risktaking). Empirical evidence demonstrates, however, that in the years prior to the Wall Street
crash, executives of these firms earned substantially more through short-term bonus incentives
and cashed-in options and stock than they lost during the crash. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et. al,
The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27
YALE J. ON REG. 257, 257 (“[T]he top executive teams of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers
derived cash flows of about $1.4 billion and $1 billion, respectively, from cash bonuses and
equity sales during 2000-2008.”).
39 See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in
an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REV. 368, 392
(2009) (“One of the major problems with executive compensation has been a focus only upon
short-term performance. Such short-term thinking often leads to opportunistic behavior, at the
expense of the long-term health of the company. By in a sense operating as a ‘lead parachute,’
prospective clawback provisions begin to align incentives over a longer time frame.”).
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incentives were the sole motivating factor behind the Financial
Crisis.40
A recent study, for example, found that the financial services
industry had “some of the longest vesting schedules in their executive
pay contracts” of any industry reviewed.41 Thus, while conventional
wisdom believes that short-term incentives are to blame for the
Financial Crisis, notably little empirical evidence in support of that
notion exists, while evidence to the contrary continues to mount.42
Interestingly, an emerging minority of scholars and critics are
offering empirical evidence debunking the mainstream notion that
incentive-based compensation encourages imprudent risk taking.43 If
these scholars are correct, the exhaustive focus on risk and
compensation may be misplaced and the practical effect of Item
402(s) may be slight.
Currently, however, the majority’s view pervades the media and
has garnered the support of the public and policymakers.44 Within the
last decade alone, egregious examples of executives acting
opportunistically to maximize personal gain at the expense of their
corporations produced significant media attention and have served as
the basis for significant corporate financial reform.45 The Enron and
WorldCom accounting scandals both serve as extreme examples of
self-serving, opportunistic, and fraudulent behavior by executives to
maximize their personal gains at the expense of the corporation and
shareholders.46
40 See Schwarcz, supra note 12, at 373–74 (suggesting that the financial crisis of 2008
was due to weaknesses in the financial markets rather than banks specifically). Nevertheless,
during 2000–2008, the top five executives at Bear Stearns and Lehman pocketed roughly $1.4
billion and $1 billion, respectively, averaging out to approximately $250 million per executive.
See Bebchuk supra note 38, at 267–73 (noting that top executives unloaded shares and options
and therefore were able to cash out much of their equity before the stock price of their firms
plummeted).
41 Radhakrishnan Gopalan et al., The Optimal Duration of Executive Compensation:
Theory and Evidence 2–3 (August 10, 2010) (The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate
Governance and Financial Regulation) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656603 (“This [finding] is somewhat surprising, given the recent
criticism that short-termism in executive compensation at banks may have contributed to the
2007-09 financial crisis.”).
42 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
43 Id.
44 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
45 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 7201-66 (2006)) (mandating widespread corporate governance reform in the areas of
accounting, executive compensation, and mandatory disclosure for public companies).
46 See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Fed Chief Blames Corporate
Greed; House Revises Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at A1 (discussing remarks on “a culture
a corporate culture blighted by ‘infectious greed’” made by then Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Alan Greenspan following the collapse of Enron); Louis Lavelle, The Best & Worst
Boards: How the Corporate Scandals Are Sparking a Revolution in Governance, BUSINESS
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Even if compensation incentives may have only been one relevant
factor among many contributing to the Financial Crisis, executives
and compensation committees are nevertheless more likely to
thoroughly vet the risks and consequences of their compensation
policies and practices if the SEC requires disclosure of compensation
risk, as the executives and directors bear potential liability for
nondisclosure or false disclosures. Accordingly, Part Two considers
how recent regulatory reform encourages public companies to
seriously review and consider the scope of their risk-management
policies and compensation packages, by requiring such companies to
disclose information about risk-management and compensationinduced risk taking.
II. ITEM 402(S): SEC DISCLOSURE OF INCENTIVE-BASED
COMPENSATION RISK MANAGEMENT
Undoubtedly, the Financial Crisis and subsequent bailout have cast
a shadow of uncertainty over current incentive-based compensation
arrangements in investment banking, mortgage, insurance, and other
industries.47 Indeed, members of the SEC have bought into the notion
that executive compensation arrangements influence risk-taking
behavior; for example, here are the comments of one sitting
Commissioner:
How executives are paid influences how they behave.
Executive behavior reveals itself in how the company
evaluates risk; in whether the management team is too tepid
or, by contrast, overconfident in pursuing new growth
opportunities; in the extent to which innovation is rewarded;
in the extent to which the corporate culture emphasizes ethics
and personal responsibility; and in whether the company’s
controls demand accountability.48
To that end, over the past decade, the SEC has significantly
expanded the scope of executive-compensation-practice disclosure.49

WEEK, Oct. 7, 2002, at 104, 114 (describing Enron as the “biggest governance failure in modern
corporate history”).
47 See supra Part I.
48 See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Comm’r, SEC, Address at the Transatlantic Corporate
Governance Dialogue: Corporate Governance and the New Financial Regulation: Complements
or Substitutes? (Oct. 25, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch
102510tap.htm).
49 See, e.g., SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 338765, 71 Fed. Reg. 78,338 (Dec. 29, 2006) (expanding the scope of compensation, disclosure,
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For example, SEC rules require most public companies to disclose
extensive information regarding all aspects of the compensation
packages awarded to the corporation’s five highest paid executives in
the annual proxy statement, including, since 2006, a comprehensive
compensation, disclosure, and analysis (“CD&A”) section.50
Predictably, the trend towards increased disclosure of compensationrelated and risk-based corporate decisions continued with the recent
disclosure-enhancement rules.
A. Rule Making Process for Item 402(s) and Final Release
To encourage disclosure and candid discussion of these sensitive
issues, the SEC recently promulgated a set of new disclosure rules
intended to compel greater disclosure of executive compensation
arrangements, as they pertain to risk taking and risk management.51 In
December 2009, the SEC issued final rules on new CD&A guidelines.
These rules are intended to enhance the laws that govern: (1)
compensation disclosure; (2) director and nominee disclosure; (3)
board-leadership and risk-oversight disclosure; (4) compensation
consultant disclosure; and (5) reporting of voting results on Form 8K.52 While “each ‘enhancement’ is important, the first—enhanced
compensation disclosures—is an explicit recognition of the supposed
need to address risk-related compensation practices across firms.”53
This Comment focuses on the amendment requiring reporting
companies to disclose any compensation policies and practices that
specifically relate to risk management.54 Specifically, companies are
instructed as follows:

and analysis disclosures in annual proxy statements).
50 See id. (“[R]evis[ing] Summary Compensation Table and Director Compensation Table
disclosure with respect to stock awards and option awards to provide disclosure of the
compensation cost of awards over the requisite service period.”).
51 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9089, 74 Fed. Reg.
68,334 (Feb. 28, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274).
52 Id.; see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Approves Enhanced Disclosure About Risk,
Compensation and Corporate Governance (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2009/2009-268.htm (“[T]he new rules will improve corporate disclosure regarding
risk, compensation and corporate governance matters when voting decisions are made.”).
53 Okatomo & Edwards, supra note 21, at 178 (arguing that current regulatory attempts to
curb excessive risk taking fail to provide an account of “optimal risk taking”); see also S.E.C.
Approves Tougher Rules on Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, available at
http://nytimes.com/2009/12/17/business/17pay.html (discussing how new rules were partly
intended to remedy “[c]ompany policies that encouraged excessive risk-taking and rewarded
executives for delivering short-term profits”).
54 See Regulation S-K Item 402(s), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s) (2010).
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To the extent that risks arising from the registrant’s
compensation policies and practices for its employees are
reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the
registrant, discuss the registrant’s policies and practices of
compensating its employees, including non-executive
officers, as they relate to risk management practices and risktaking incentives.55
Although this provision has the potential to significantly impact
incentive-based compensation practices, its practical effect will be
largely based on how the SEC interprets and enforces the rule. First, a
review of the rule-making process is necessary to grasp what the SEC
intended to accomplish by implementing the rule, and in turn, what
type of information should be disclosed to meet the intended
objective.
1. Rule Making History and Intent
These rules had been anticipated for some time.56 At the onset of
the Financial Crisis, the SEC acknowledged a need for greater
transparency in executive compensation practices, “especially with
regard to activities that materially contribute to a company’s risk
profile.”57 Concurrently, the SEC perceived a corporate governance
failure stemming from “compensation policies [that] ha[d] become
disconnected from long-term company performance because the
interests of management and some employees, in the form of
incentive compensation arrangements, and the long-term well-being
of the company [were] not sufficiently aligned.”58
The rule, as originally proposed, required disclosure of risks
arising from compensation policies that may have an adverse effect
on the company. Notably, the final rule replaces “may” with
“reasonably likely to,” a higher standard of certainty.59 By making
Id. (emphasis added).
The proposed rules were issued mid-2009. See Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation
Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,076 (proposed July 17, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
229, 239, 240, 249, 270 and 274).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 35077 (citing FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND
COMPENSATION PRACTICES 1 (2009), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_
0904b.pdf).
59 In response to a number of comments submitted following publication of the proposing
release, the SEC determined that raising the threshold standard of certainty to reasonably likely
would lessen the potential for overreaching, and would provide shareholders with disclosure of
the most meaningful information, rather than an overwhelming and undecipherable information
dump. See Proxy Disclosure Statements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,336-37 (Dec. 23, 2009)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s)) (discussing that broad disclosure requirements could have a
materially adverse effect on companies).
55
56
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this alteration, the SEC significantly reduced the risk of
overdisclosure, as “may” is perhaps the broadest possible form of
probability. This change parallels the SEC’s prior approach to riskbased disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis
(“MD&A”) under Item 303 of Regulation S-K.60
2. Final Rule Release
As discussed above, the new disclosure requirements are intended
to help shareholders better understand and evaluate the leadership of
public companies.61 Item 402(s) requires a narrative discussion of
how a company’s overall employee compensation policies create
incentives that can affect the company’s risk profile and how the
company manages that risk.62 Additionally, in contrast to the
traditional disclosure about executive compensation, which focused
exclusively on senior management, Item 402(s) requires a company to
address its compensation policies and practices for all employees to
the extent they create risks that are reasonably likely to have a
material adverse effect on the company.63 This means, for example,
that a bank must consider the compensation schemes that, for
example, might entice a low- or middle-ranking trader to engage in
the high risk trading epitomized by “rogue traders,” such as Jerome
Kerviel at Société Générale.64
To assist companies in executing the arguably onerous task of
evaluating compensation risk for all employees, the final rule
includes a non-exclusive list of situations in which compensation
policies and practices may raise material risks to companies and the
concomitant requirement to discuss them, as follows:
 At a business unit of the company that carries a
significant portion of the company’s risk profile;
 At a business unit with compensation structured
significantly differently than other units within the company;

60
See Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 8182,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,264, 68 Fed. Reg. 5982, at 5984-85 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249) (adopting a “reasonably likely” standard for disclosure of perceived
risks, events or uncertainities in the MD&A context); see also infra notes 77–78 and
accompanying text.
61 See Proxy Disclosure Statements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,336-37.
62 See SEC Regulation S-K Item 402(s), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s) (2010).
63 Id.
64
See, e.g., Nicola Clark, Rogue Trader at Société Générale Gets 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/business/global/06bank.
html?pagewanted=1&sq=societe%20generale&st=Search&scp=2.
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 At a business unit that is significantly more profitable
than others within the company;
 At a business unit where compensation expense is a
significant percentage of the unit’s revenues; and
 That very significantly from the overall risk and reward
structure of the company, such as when bonuses are awarded
upon accomplishment of a task, while the income and risk to
the company from the task extend over a significantly longer
period of time.65
Item 402(s) specifies that the above list is not exhaustive, however, it
is a good starting point.66 During its evaluation of compensation risk,
a company should consider whether any of the company’s business
units fall within the descriptions in the above list. In any such unit or
division, the company’s evaluation should analyze the key employees
or groups of employees. If the company considers these employees in
addition to the compensation practices relating to executives, the
company can be confident that its evaluation satisfies Item 402(s)
requirements.
B. Scope of Item 402(s)
1. Determination of Materiality
As a threshold issue, companies must first determine whether their
compensation arrangements create risks, and second, whether such
risks are reasonably likely to have a materially adverse effect on the
company.67 The general standard of materiality, set forth in TSC
Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,68 is whether there is a “substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of [an] omitted fact would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the
‘total mix’ of information made available.”69 Further, in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson,70 the Supreme Court adopted the TSC Industries standard of
65 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337. The SEC indicated that this is
intended to be a non-exhaustive list, as other situations may arise that warrant disclosure and
discussion. Id. Further, even in the above-listed scenarios, the SEC believes that a company
could reasonably conclude that the requisite risk is not present. Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68
426 U.S. 438 (1976).
69 Id. at 449 (holding that “[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote”); see also
SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (stating that
misstatements that have the effect of increasing management’s compensation may well render
material a relatively small misstatement of a financial item).
70
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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materiality for the anti-fraud context,71 and applied a
“probability/magnitude” balancing approach to determine materiality
in the case of contingent or speculative information or events.72
The SEC provided additional guidance on the extent to which
companies must disclose risk-taking compensation incentives through
recently released comments.73 Specifically, the SEC explained that
the “reasonably likely” standard parallels the Management’s
Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) disclosure requirements74
Interestingly, the SEC specifically rejected the Basic
“probability/magnitude” test general materiality standard when
interpreting the “reasonably likely” standard in the MD&A context,75
and instead, applied a two-prong approach to interpretation of the
“reasonably likely” standard:
[T]wo assessments management must make where a trend,
demand, commitment, event or uncertainty is known:
1. Is the known trend, demand, commitment, event or
uncertainty likely to come to fruition? If management
determines that it is not reasonably likely to occur, no
disclosure is required.
2. If management cannot make that determination, it must
evaluate objectively the consequences of the known trend,
demand, commitment, event or uncertainty, on the
assumption that it will come to fruition. Disclosure is then
required unless management determines that a material effect

71

Id. at 232.
Id. at 238–39 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2nd Cir.
1968)) (holding that where information or events are speculative, such as in the merger
negotiation context, materiality “‘will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the
indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light
of the totality of the company activity’”).
73 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,337 (Dec. 23, 2009)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s)).
74 Id. at 68,336. For example, the MD&A imposes a forward-looking duty to “[i]dentify
any known trends or any known demands, commitments, events or uncertainties that will result
in or that are reasonably likely to result in the registrant’s liquidity increasing or decreasing in
any material way.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).
75 See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,057 n.6 (Dec. 29, 2003)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241) (“‘The probability/magnitude test for materiality . . . is
inapposite to [MD&A] disclosure.’”) (quoting Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures,
Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427,
22,430 n.27 (May 24, 1989) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 211, 231, 241, 271)).
72
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on the registrant’s financial condition or results of operations
is not reasonably likely to occur.76
Accordingly, Item 402(s) requires disclosure of compensation risk
unless the risk is not reasonably likely to occur and/or the risk is not
reasonably likely to cause a materially adverse effect.
Such an approach may seem puzzling to an investor at first glance.
Intuitively, one would assume that should an incentive-based
compensation practice tied to risk taking materialize and result in a
materially adverse effect on the corporation, a shareholder would
likely assert that had the short-term risk-rewarding compensation
practice been disclosed, the shareholder would not have invested in
the corporation, or perhaps would have voted against the
compensation policy. But in MD&A, and now in Item 402(s), the
SEC chose the pragmatic approach of “reducing the possibility that
investors will be overwhelmed by voluminous disclosure of
insignificant and possibly unnecessarily speculative information.”77
This formulation follows the approach adopted by the Supreme Court
in its definitions of materiality, taking into account Judge Friendly’s
concern with the term “might,” as explained by Justice Marshall in
the seminal materiality case TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.:
We are aware, however, that the disclosure policy
embodied in the proxy regulations is not without limit. Some
information is of such dubious significance that insistence on
its disclosure may accomplish more harm than good. The
potential liability for a Rule 14a-9 violation can be great
indeed, and if the standard of materiality is unnecessarily low,
not only may the corporation and its management be
subjected to liability for insignificant omissions or
misstatements, but also management's fear of exposing itself
to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information—a result
that is hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking.
Precisely these dangers are presented, we think, by the
definition of a material fact adopted by the Court of Appeals
76 Commission Statement About Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8056, Exchange Act Release
No. 45,321, 67 Fed. Reg. 3746, 3748 (Jan. 25, 2002) (citing Management’s Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company
Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. at 22,430).
77 Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis about Off-Balance Sheet
Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act Release No. 8182,
Exchange Act Release No. 47,264, 68 Fed. Reg. 5982, at 5985 (Feb. 5, 2003) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 249).
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in this case—a fact which a reasonable shareholder might
consider important. We agree with Judge Friendly, speaking
for the Court of Appeals in Gerstle, that the “might”
formulation is “too suggestive of mere possibility, however
unlikely.”78
Presumably, the “reasonably likely” standard requires a determination
by the company involving a higher level of certainty that a particular
compensation incentive actually creates a risk, which is “reasonably
likely” to occur, and will have a materially adverse effect on the
company if it does occur.
Further, the MD&A section sets forth a “knowledge” requirement,
mandating that the corporation have knowledge of the events and/or
conditions that are reasonably likely to materially affect some aspect
of the corporation.79 Thus, the MD&A requires management to assess
what it has already contemplated as a risk or at least is aware of as a
trend, event, or uncertainty. Such a knowledge requirement is
noticeably lacking in Item 402(s); in effect, the SEC is treating all
compensation as inherently risky, and therefore something that must
be assessed for possible adverse effect. Accordingly, we can infer that
corporations have both a duty to first investigate potential risks
relating to compensation and then to determine whether those
identified risks rise to “reasonably likely” level.80 Importantly,
compensation committees must evaluate compensation risk by
expanding the focus beyond the executive officers to all employees.
Although there is some risk involved in all corporate activity, the
financial services industry inherently involves high levels of risk.81
Arguably, when incentive-based compensation is tied to short-term
profits, which is in turn dependent on short-term risk taking, there is a
potential for opportunistic abuse by executives and employees.82
Whether an accurate portrayal or not, conventional wisdom maintains
that executives are more likely to focus on short-term profits at the
expense of potential long-term disaster.83 Accordingly, under many
circumstances, short-term incentives may well be considered
78 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
79 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1).
80 See, e.g., J & R Mktg., SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the company must have actual knowledge about the information at issue).
Requiring disclosure of information that is “knowable” would “extend[] the duty to disclose
information to include a duty to first investigate and then disclose . . . [which] directly
contradicts the text of Item 303.” Id.
81 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
82 See supra Part I.
83 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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“reasonably likely” to have a materially adverse effect on the
corporation, and failure to disclose such material information may
result in liability.84 It is clear that both the SEC and Congress
intended to capture incentive-based short-term risk taking in the
recent reform:
First, incentive comp arrangements should provide
employees with incentives that are appropriately balanced so
they do not encourage employees to expose their
organizations to imprudent risk.
Second, these arrangements should be compatible with
effective controls and risk management.
And third, these arrangements should be supported by
strong corporate governance, including active oversight by
the organization’s board of directors.85
When viewed in conjunction with disclosure enhancements requiring
discussion of internal risk management policies and procedures,86
disclosure of executive hedging activity,87 and shareholder “say-onpay” provisions,88 it is apparent that transparency was a chief concern
of Congress and the SEC.
To illustrate how a company might approach evaluation of
compensation risk and Item 402(s) disclosure, consider the following
hypothetical. BigPharma is large public company subject to
Regulation S-K and, therefore, Form 10-K and annual proxy
disclosure requirements. Research and development (“R&D”) is often
a large and crucial component of a pharmaceutical company’s future
profitability, but can also be very expensive and risky. 89 Rather than
SEC Regulation S-K Item 402(s), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s) (2010).
See, e.g., Executive Compensation Oversight After the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th
Cong. 4 (2010) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System) (describing the guidance adopted by the Federal Reserve); see also id.
60–69 (statement of Meredith Cross, Director of Division of Corporate Finance, Securities
Exchange Council) (describing new SEC rules addressing executive compensation).
86 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,344 (Dec. 23, 2009)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274) (requiring new disclosures regarding board
leadership structure and the board’s role in risk oversight).
87 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires companies
to disclose to shareholders whether they permit any employee or board member to purchase
financial instruments that are designed to offset or hedge any decrease in market value of their
equity-related compensation. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, § 955, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904–05 (2010).
88 Id. § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (requiring a separate resolution at proxy meetings on which
shareholders will vote to improve the compensation of executives).
89 See
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
PHARMACEUTICAL R&D: COSTS, RISKS AND REWARDS (1993) (focusing on the potential
impacts that changes in federal policy could have on the economic side of pharmaceutical
84
85
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developing new drug therapies internally, BigPharma focuses much
of its strategic R&D efforts on acquisition of experimental patents
and small start-up biotech companies with seemingly promising drug
pipelines.
Suppose that BigPharma hires an acquisition team of prominent
scientists and physicians to seek out the most promising new startups
and patents before they come to market (i.e. before FDA trials have
begun or during early-stage trials). Suppose further that when
BigPharma acquires a target company or patent, it pays its R&D
acquisition team an immediate bonus equal to a percentage of the
estimated market value that the drug is anticipated to generate over
the course of its lifecycle (as opposed to, for example, a continuing
percentage of the value stream payable over time). Given that a
successful drug therapy in a large market (such as diabetes or blood
pressure treatments) can generate several billion dollars during its
product lifecycle,90 the acquisition team bonuses are substantial and
material to the company in the aggregate.
In light of Item 402(s), BigPharma’s compensation committee
must evaluate the R&D acquisition team’s compensation
arrangement. The R&D team is compensated based on forecasts made
upon completion of an acquisition, while the income and risk to
BigPharma that the drug will be approved by the FDA and prove
successful in the market extend over a significantly longer period of
time. This is the precise situation found on the SEC’s laundry list of
enumerated “situations that potentially could trigger discussion.”91
Accordingly, the R&D acquisition team’s compensation structure
certainly has the potential to have a materially adverse effect on the
company. Next, BigPharma must evaluate whether the risk is
reasonably likely to come to fruition. If so, or if the likelihood of the
risk materializing is too uncertain to determine, BigPharma must
analyze whether the arrangement is reasonably likely to create a
materially adverse effect. Overall, the test of what constitutes a
“materially adverse effect” is not a new concept, and will follow the
same MD&A test that is familiar to reporting companies.92

research and development).
90 For example, Pfizer’s Lipitor, a blockbuster cholesterol drug, earned $12.88 billion in
revenue in 2006 alone. See Theresa Agovino, Lipitor to Face Pressure from Insurers, U.S.A.
TODAY (Mar. 19, 2007), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-03-19-1475497100_x.htm
(describing Pfizer’s potential revenue pressures as insurers offer customers generic drugs for
free upon the expiration of the Lipitor patent).
91 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,337 (Dec. 23, 2009) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s)).
92 See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
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The question of whether something is “reasonably likely” to occur
is highly subjective, however, and requires some knowledge about the
players, industry, human psychology, and the extent of other
controlling factors, such as the company’s corporate culture and
internal risk management policies. Some questions a reporting
company might need to ask include: Are the players risk adverse?
How do they value their long-term reputation versus near-term
wealth? What is the likely duration of the employee’s continuing
work for the company? Does the employee favor short-term gain over
long-term loyalty to the company? One can imagine that two
companies could reasonably reach opposite conclusions about the
“reasonable likelihood” of a material adverse effect stemming from
similar policies simply based on the risk-taking propensities of the
individuals involved.
2. Drafting Item 402(s) Disclosures
After a company completes the material risk evaluation, its focus
must shift to drafting the Item 402(s) disclosure. Where no material
risks exist, a reporting company is technically not required to
affirmatively state that it has determined that any risks arising from its
compensation practices are not reasonably likely to have a materially
adverse effect on the company.93 Yet, during the 2010 proxy season,
the majority of companies evaluated made an affirmative statement
that no risks creating a materially adverse effect existed.94 Further, the
SEC seemed more likely to issue comments to companies that did not
provide such a voluntary “negating” risk assessment disclosure.95
This follows what appears to be a fairly normal pattern: negative
statements are often found in periodic reports apparently either as a
reminder to the preparer to re-consider the issue in later filings or as
evidence that they have done so currently.
If, however, a company determines that disclosure is required, the
SEC set forth numerous considerations and issues the company may
need to address:
 The general design philosophy of the company’s
compensation policies and practices for employees whose
behavior would be most affected by the incentives established
by the policies and practices, as such policies and practices

93
94
95

Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337.
See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
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relate to or affect risk taking by those employees on behalf of
the company, and the manner of their implementation;
 The company’s risk assessment or incentive
considerations, if any, in structuring its compensation policies
and practices or in awarding and paying compensation;
 How the company’s compensation policies and
practices relate to the realization of risks resulting from the
actions of employees in both the short term and the long term,
such as through policies requiring claw backs or imposing
holding periods;
 The company’s policies regarding adjustments to its
compensation policies and practices to address changes in its
risk profile;
 Material adjustments the company has made to its
compensation policies and practices as a result of changes in
its risk profile; and
 The extent to which the company monitors its
compensation policies and practices to determine whether its
risk management objectives are being met with respect to
incentivizing its employees.96
At first glance, the list appears detailed and onerous. Importantly,
discussion of these factors is only required if the compensation
policies and practices create risks that are reasonably likely to have a
materially adverse effect on the company.97 Additionally, the rule
requires analysis and discussion about specific facts and
circumstances—generic boilerplate language is insufficient.98 A
review of 2010 proxy disclosures reveals how companies initially
interpreted the scope of the Item 402(s) disclosure requirements.
a. 2010 Proxy Season Disclosures
Following the 2010 proxy season—the first year in which most
companies were required to address the new rule—several
compensation consulting companies conducted reviews of Item
402(s) disclosures made during the 2010 proxy season.99 The reviews
revealed three broad trends: silence, affirmative disclosure, and
mitigation disclosure. Interestingly, albeit not surprisingly, none of

Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337.
Id.
98 Id. For example, a company cannot merely state that compensation risk is necessary to
attract or retain the most talented employees. Id.
99 See infra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
96
97
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the reviewed proxy statements articulated a specific unmitigated
risk.100
A report reviewing 215 of the 301 nonfinancial S&P 400
companies analyzed a number of variables, including: whether
companies provided risk-assessment disclosure in their proxy filings,
where the disclosures were located, the employee population covered,
whether actual results of risk assessment were disclosed, how
companies viewed risk mitigation, and any changes made by
companies to address compensation risk.101 The study found that
although most companies reported a risk assessment (67%), no
materially adverse risks were disclosed.102 Of those companies that
did perform a risk assessment, very few described the process used to
determine that there were no materially adverse risks; rather, “the
disclosures emphasized how plan design elements have served to
mitigate risk.”103 Generally, the study reported an overall lack of
consistency and substance.104
Another report, which reviewed 223 S&P 500 companies,
evaluated the disclosures along three measures of compliance:
process, mitigators, and affirmative statements.105 Again, not
surprisingly, no materially adverse risks were identified in any of the
disclosures.106 The study found that 80% of companies discussed the
process for evaluating risk in their compensation practices; 56%
described risk-mitigating elements of their compensation practices;
and 64% of companies included either an implicit or explicit
affirmative statement about the riskiness of their compensation
practices.107
Comparison of these disclosures to the SEC final release and
stated intent reveal potentially striking disparities. Either companies
are underreporting the extent to which their compensation policies
incentivize imprudent risk taking, as conventional wisdom would lead
one to believe, or as the reality of the case may be, the compensation
100 For example, Fortune Brands, Inc. stated that they believe that there are no risks arising
from their compensation policies that are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on
the company. Further, they provide a “mitigation” disclosure outlining how the compensation
committee, with the assistance of independent compensation consultant, reached its decision.
FORTUNE BRANDS INC., Definitive Proxy Statement (SCHEDULE 14A) (Mar. 8, 2010).
101 BUCK CONSULTANTS, STUDY OF 2009 COMPENSATION RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICES
AMONG S&P 400 NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES (2010).
102 Id. at 5.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 SEMLER BROSSY CONSULTING GROUP, LLC, COMPENSATION R ISK DISCLOSURE–
WHAT ARE COMPANIES DOING?: A STUDY OF S&P 500 COMPANIES (2010).
106 Id. at 1.
107 Id. at 2–3.
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arrangements at the vast majority of public companies simply do not
encourage imprudent risk-taking behavior to the extent many believe.
Alternatively, mitigation mechanisms are already in place.
Further, a challenge to the fundamental notions of transparency
and information asymmetry emerges in light of these findings. If
companies do not apply a consistent approach towards risk
assessment and disclosure, how can investors truly benefit from the
SEC’s requirement to provide narrative disclosures of risk? Currently,
the lack of overall consistency within proxy disclosures seems to
create a confusing web of information. More information is
meaningless unless it is useful information that can be understood in
context and compared to other similar information. Given the lack of
uniformity in current disclosure, it is difficult for an investor to
rationally compare the compensation risks among companies.
b. Utilizing Remedial Mechanisms and Deferments to Avoid
Disclosure of Specific Risks.
Drafting the disclosure obviously becomes more precarious if
material risks exist. In that instance, the company would have several
conceivable options. First, a company could simply disclose the risk.
While it may be the most straightforward approach, the 2010 proxy
season illustrates a clear preference to avoid affirmative disclosures of
material risks.108 In the BigPharma hypothetical scenario, suppose
BigPharma chose to proceed as planned with the R&D Acquisition
bonus plan. BigPharma would be required to disclose the facts and
circumstances of the compensation agreement.109 Its Item 402(s)
disclosure might read something along these lines: Our compensation
committee regularly conducts a risk assessment of our compensation
policies and practices for our executive officers and other employees.
The committee’s assessment for the current year evaluated the
company’s R&D acquisition team compensation agreement, which
guarantees the team a current cash payment equal to 5% of the
projected lifetime market value of any newly acquired biotech
company or drug patent attributable to the team’s efforts. The
committee determined that the team’s compensation arrangement
involves an inherent level of risk of a materially adverse effect on our
long-term results by potentially overpaying the team members in the
event that actual results of the acquisition are materially worse than
108 See

supra notes 99–107 and accompanying text.
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,336–37 (Dec. 23, 2009)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s)) (requiring discussion of compensation policies if the risks
arising from those policies are reasonably likely to have a material effect on a company).
109 See
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those projected. The committee believes that the risk is reasonable,
however, because all targets are thoroughly vetted, and due diligence
was conducted and reviewed by our corporate executives, directors,
and independent consultants prior to acquisition.
Obviously, while the above disclosure meets the technical
requirements of Item 402(s), it may not meet the approval of
shareholders and potential investors.110 Companies in 2010
unanimously sought to avoid disclosure of specific compensation
risks that were reasonably likely to create a material risk.111 To avoid
making a negative disclosure, BigPharma must choose between
restructuring the compensation agreement and utilizing a remedial
mechanism to mitigate the risk. BigPharma may wish to avoid
making a negative disclosure but maintain the underlying “incentive”
bonus paid to the R&D team. Several remedial mechanisms are
available. Prospective clawback mechanisms probably provide the
most liberal check against incentive-based compensation risk.112 In a
clawback, the employee receives the compensation upfront, but
assumes the risk of having to repay the amount should later events
demonstrate he was overpaid.113 The problem with the clawback, of
course, is that the employee may leave the company, spend the
money, and refuse to cooperate in repaying. For this reason, the more
widely utilized mechanisms are forms of deferred compensation, as
well as forfeiture and recoupment policies, which are more restrictive
for the individual employee but provide a better check against risk, as
they align the employee’s compensation with the long-term
profitability of the company.114
Of course, any combination of the above mechanisms can be
utilized to mitigate the particular compensation risk to a point in
110 See infra Part II(C) for a detailed discussion of how the recent Dodd-Frank legislation
expands shareholder control and influence over compensation practices.
111 See supra notes 102, 106 and accompanying text.
112 For a detailed discussion of prospective clawback agreements, see Cherry & Wong,
supra note 39, at 388–92 (describing how prospective clawback agreements are becoming more
commonplace). A review of voluntarily adopted claw-back agreements adopted by various
publicly traded companies provides a foundation for the drafting of such agreements. See, e.g.,
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO., Definitive Proxy Statement (SCHEDULE 14A) 19 (Mar. 5, 2010)
(restructuring its clawback provisions and policy to allow the board “discretion to recapture
compensation for any conduct that is detrimental to the company, rather than just fraudulent or
intentional misconduct, and that, in all cases, it will seek reimbursement if an executive has
engaged in fraudulent conduct”); VERIZON COMMC’NS INC., Definitive Proxy Statement
(SCHEDULE 14A) 44 (Mar. 8, 2010) (stating that the compensation committee adopted a “policy
that enables the Company to recapture and cancel certain incentive payments received by an
executive who has engaged in financial misconduct”).
113
See Cherry & Wong, supra note 39, at 410–11(defining the scope and identifying
features of clawbacks).
114 See, e.g., Tung, supra note 13, at 13–35.

1/11/2011 12:04:12 PM

26

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:3

which the compensation committee feels comfortable concluding that
the risk is not reasonably likely to have a materially adverse effect.
Suppose, for instance, that BigPharma’s compensation committee
chose to revise the R&D acquisition team’s compensation agreement.
Instead of offering a guaranteed lump-sum bonus upon acquisition of
a target, BigPharma will offer the employees 25% of the total bonus
award in cash at the time of acquisition. The bulk of the acquisition
bonus will then be deferred over a period of time until certain
benchmarks are met, subject to a forfeiture provision (i.e. the
employees will receive 25% of the outstanding bonus when the drug
receives FDA approval, 25% when the drug meets certain sales
projections, and 25% at retirement). Payment of each deferred
payment is contingent upon the achievement of the particular goal.
For instance, if the drug does not receive FDA approval, the
employees will forfeit the remaining 75% of bonus.
Aligning the employees’ bonus compensation with the long-term
success of the underlying drug is likely sufficient to mitigate any
potential risks.115 Accordingly, BigPharma would not be required to
disclose details of the team’s compensation agreement. If BigPharma
chose to disclose, the statement may read as follows: Our
compensation committee regularly conducts a risk assessment of our
compensation policies and practices for our executive officers and
other employees. The committee’s assessment for the current year
evaluated the company’s R&D acquisition team agreement. Although
the team is compensated for targeted acquisitions, only a small
portion of the team’s total bonus compensation is guaranteed and
short-term in nature. Since the majority of the team’s incentive-based
bonus compensation is long-term, contingent upon the achievement of
various benchmarks, and subject to forfeiture, the team’s
compensation is closely aligned with the company’s risk and income,
thereby mitigating the extent to which the compensation arrangement
could produce an adverse effect.
3. What to Expect in the Future
The SEC was notably quiet on Item 402(s) disclosures following
the 2010 proxy season, particularly in light of the relatively sparse
substantive disclosures provided by most companies. It did, however,
issue comment letters to a number of companies, which generally fell
115 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,337 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249, 274) (noting that disclosure will serve to mitigate risks caused
when companies award task-based bonuses to employees but the company continues to face risk
from that task for a longer period of time).
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under one of two categories. Some letters were issued to companies
that omitted Item 402(s) discussion entirely,116 which seems peculiar
given that companies are not required to make any disclosure if there
are no compensation risks.117 Other comment letters were issued to
companies that made disclosures, but failed to mention the process
they used to arrive at their conclusions regarding risk.118
Nevertheless, such results are not surprising. First and foremost,
the SEC consistently emphasizes the “why” and “how” of a
company’s decision-making process. If the company determines that
there are no material risks reasonably likely to have an adverse effect
on the company, a simple statement that such risks do not exist will
likely be insufficient. Rather, the SEC is seeking substantive
discussion exploring why such risks do not exist (for example, did the
company implement remedial risk-reduction measures in its
compensation arrangements such as clawbacks, deferrals, etc.), and
how the company came to its conclusion (for example, does the
company employ an independent compensation consultant, did the
board of directors thoroughly vet the various compensation factors
involved). Likewise, if a company concludes that such risks may or
do exist but are not material or not reasonably likely to have an
adverse effect, the deductive process that led to such a conclusion
should be articulated.
It should be noted, however, that simply because the SEC has not
yet provided further clarification regarding the scope of the disclosure
requirements, does not necessarily mean that it will not in the future.
In terms of additional guidance and enforcement, the SEC’s handling
of the MD&A disclosure may serve as an illustration as to how the
SEC intends to construe and enforce the recent disclosure
enhancements.
The current MD&A framework was adopted in 1980, and requires
a discussion of “liquidity,” “capital resources,” “results of
operations,” and “other information that the registrant believes to be
necessary to an understanding of its financial condition, changes in
financial condition and results of operations.”119 The 1980
requirements were far more comprehensive than prior iterations, but
were intentionally broad to encourage meaningful disclosure rather
than boilerplate discussions.120 Despite the 1980 version’s broad
116 See

BUCK CONSULTING, supra note 101, at 10.
SEC Regulation S-K Item 402(s), 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(s) (2010) (requiring
narrative disclosure only if there are compensation risks).
118 See BUCK CONSULTING, supra note 101, at 10.
119 Regulation S-K Item 303, 17 C.F.R. 229.303(a) (2010).
120 Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
117 See
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scope, the SEC found that the original general language led to
underreporting, non-compliance, and minimal enforcement.121 Eight
years later, the SEC embarked on a sweeping review of MD&A
disclosures, which resulted in hundreds of comment letters,
amendments, and requests for future compliance.122 In addition, in
1989 the SEC issued an interpretive guidance release that provided
significantly more detailed and specific disclosure requirements,
arguably expanding the scope of MD&A far beyond what was
originally contemplated by most registrants and commentators.123
Indeed, the clarity with which MD&A is written today is likely
largely dependent on this and subsequent formal and informal SEC
interpretations and staff discussions, rather than the rule as written.
So too may be true for Item 402(s).
It is conceivable for the SEC to proceed in a similar fashion with
respect to Item 402(s). Such a situation is more likely to occur if the
SEC believes that the rule, as written without more guidance, is not
compelling the type and depth of disclosure intended. While not
providing much substantive guidance beyond the final release, the
SEC has spoken numerous times on their intent in implementing Item
402(s)—to combat compensation based incentives to engage in
excessive risk taking.124
Accordingly, companies should be encouraged to err on the side of
caution in considering whether to disclose various risk-taking
incentives. Preferably, companies should seek to establish riskmanagement policies and execute agreements with executives to
prospectively limit the extent to which various incentive-based
compensation practices may encourage employees to take imprudent
risks. To avoid the ambiguity and liability issues associated with Item
402(s), companies should consider utilizing mitigation mechanisms as
a means to properly comply with the requirements of Item 402(s),
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed.
Reg. 22,427 (May 24, 1989).
121 Id. at 22,427–28.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See Shelley Parratt, Deputy Director, Div. of Corporate Fin., Speech by SEC Staff:
Executive Compensation Disclosure: Observations on the 2009 Proxy Season and Expectations
for 2010, Speech Before the Fourth Annual Proxy Disclosure Conference (Nov. 9, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch110909sp.htm) (describing how it is the
SEC’s role to help provide investors with insight into the compensation policies of companies
so that investors can make informed, risk-based investment decisions); Mary L. Schapiro,
Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman: Statement at SEC Open Meeting
(July 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch070109mls.htm
(describing the need by investors to receive correct information regarding executive
compensation).
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while avoiding specific and explicit disclosure of incentive-based
compensation risks.
Above all, corporate boards and officers should be diligent in their
effort to fully and fairly evaluate and disclose risk situations before
they create actual exposure to the company. No company wants to be
the “poster child” for noncompliance, as Caterpillar was for MD&A
non-disclosure.125
C. Shareholder Empowerment
Finally, and perhaps most importantly from a practical perspective,
the ultimate impact of Item 402(s) may stretch beyond a mere
disclosure provision, particularly given the potential interplay among
the new Dodd-Frank provisions. For example, one could easily
imagine shareholder disapproval in the event a company discloses
that its compensation practices are reasonably likely to have an
adverse effect on the company. Suppose, hypothetically, that the
California Public Employees’ Retirement System (“CalPERS”) owns
5% of BigPharma’s common stock and relies on RiskMetrics for a
determination of how to vote its “say-on-pay” vote. Undoubtedly, a
negative disclosure under Item 402(s) will raise a red flag for
RiskMetrics, which will likely result in a recommendation for
CalPERS to reject BigPharma’s proposed compensation packages.126
The consequences are twofold. First, the votes of other shareholders
will be affected if they are aware of BigPharma’s “no” vote or have
access to RiskMetrics’ advice themselves.127 Second, suppose
BigPharma’s board of directors decides to ignore the negative votes,
CalPERS among them, and approves Company X’s compensation
arrangements going into the next year. The board members should be
willing to forego their Board seats following next year’s proxy vote,
125
See In re Caterpillar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-30,532, 51 SEC Docket (CCH)
147 (March 31, 1992) (issuing a cease-and-desist order for Caterpillar’s failure to disclose
financial results about its Brazilian subsidiary because there was known future uncertainty
regarding the subsidiary’s operations and the subsidiary’s current earnings materially affected
Caterpillar’s reported income).
126 In its 2011 corporate governance policy update, ISS explicitly states that although
executive pay and practices are evaluated on a case-by-case basis, its current recommendation if
a company maintains problematic pay practices is to generally vote against management “say on
pay” proposals. INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERS., U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICY: 2011
UPDATES 16 (2010), available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/ISS2011USPolicyUpdates
20101119.pdf. Although “say-on-pay” votes are not votes regarding compensation risk,
shareholders are nevertheless likely to view compensation practices that create a risk of adverse
effects on the company as problematic.
127 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111–203,
§ 951(d), 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (requiring disclosure by institutional investment managers
on how they voted in shareholder “say-on-pay” votes).
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as BigPharma has likely adopted a majority-vote requirement for the
election of directors. In addition, SEC rule provisions now being
contested in the courts, will, if upheld, provide CalPERS with the
unqualified right to nominate a new board member to be included on
the proxy voting cards.128 In short, disgruntled shareholders now have
more power to directly influence Board behavior—at least in theory.
Depending on how the SEC construes the scope of disclosure, these
issues are more likely to arise as companies will be forced to disclose
more substantive information. The SEC’s precedential approach in
other areas of disclosure indicates that the scope of Item 402(s)
disclosure may ultimately be broader than companies now hope.129
Accordingly, the incentive for compensation committees to
mitigate or eliminate compensation risk and avoid disclosure extends
beyond public perception and forced disclosure. Fundamentally, it is
assumed that the more information is disclosed, the more information
shareholders can evaluate in making proxy-and-trading decisions and
potential investors can consider in determining whether to invest.130
Interestingly, Congress now seems to be shifting its focus beyond
mere disclosure and transparency to shareholder empowerment and
policing.131 Instead of “voting with their feet,” shareholders now
harness greater influence and control over public companies and their
Boards—at least in theory. Whether any practical effects will result,
and whether compensation risk disclosure will expand beyond a mere
nuisance for compensation committees remains to be seen. One thing
is for certain—compensation risk has been thrust into the spotlight.
The potential interaction among the various new rules and regulations
are complex and substantial, and will undoubtedly be developed over
the coming years.

128 Id. § 971, 124 Stat. at 1915 (providing shareholders holding greater than 5% of a
company’s stock with an unqualified board seat nomination to be included on the company’s
proxy voting cards distributed to shareholders providing that the shareholder has held the stock
for at least three years and will continue to hold the stock through the next election); see also
Order Granting Stay In the Matter of the Motion of Business Roundtable and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America, Securities Act Release No. 9149, Exchange Act
Release No. 63,031, Investment Company Act Release No. 29, 456, 75 Fed. Reg. 64,641 (Oct.
4, 2010) (ordering stay of SEC rules implementing § 971 mandates and summarizing pending
litigation).
129 See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 2–3, 7 and accompanying text.
131 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 124 Stat. at
1899–900 (setting forth shareholder “say-on-pay” provisions); see also id. § 971, 124 Stat. at
1915 (providing shareholders holding greater than 5% of a company’s stock with an unqualified
board seat nomination to be included on the company’s proxy voting cards distributed to
shareholders).
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III. CONCLUSION
The precise scope of disclosure required under Item 402(s) will
likely be shaped in the years to come. Undoubtedly, the evidence is
conflicting as to whether executives and their employees knowingly
engaged in excessive risky behavior for short-term economic gain.132
Yet, pursuant to Item 402(s), companies should prudently evaluate
and monitor their compensation practices, particularly incentivebased compensation, to the extent it may encourage or allow for
employees to engage in adverse risk taking.
Most importantly, as with any disclosure, companies should be
honest and forthright in drafting their Item 402(s) disclosures. If any
compensation risks surface during the compensation committee
evaluation process, companies should consider use of mitigation
mechanisms such as deferments or clawbacks as components of a
well-designed risk management and compensation practice plan, if
they have not already done so.133 Diligence and full disclosure are
certainly advisable as these new regulations take effect and their
ultimate reach is still uncertain.
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132 See

supra notes 14–15, 38 and accompanying text.
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